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STANDING AND PRIVACY HARMS: A CRITIQUE OF
TRANSUNION V. RAMIREZ
BY DANIEL J. SOLOVE* & DANIELLE KEATS CITRON**

In this term, the U.S. Supreme Court has significantly undermined the
effectiveness of many privacy laws. Through the standing doctrine, the U.S.
Supreme Court essentially nullified a key enforcement component of many
privacy laws—private rights of action. The decision in TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez1 revisits the issue of standing and privacy harms under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) that began with Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins2 in 2016.3
This case arguably strikes a major blow to the enforcement of privacy laws in
the federal courts. While state courts do not have the same restrictive rules to
hearing cases and controversies, federal standing rules have a way of leaching
into judicial thinking. So TransUnion may have reverberations beyond just the
federal courts.
TransUnion has special relevance for our forthcoming article Privacy Harms
in the Boston University Law Review.4 We write separately here to discuss the
TransUnion case and its potential impact. We contend that TransUnion is wrong
and troubling on many levels. At the broadest level, we argue that the Court’s
current standing doctrine is wrong as a matter of history and policy. Even
accepting current standing doctrine, we contend that the Court’s test for
recognizing concrete injuries is severely flawed. The Court’s application of its
test is also marred by an inadequate understanding of privacy harms. Finally, the
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1 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
2 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
3 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204 (“[W]ith respect to the concrete-harm requirement in
particular, this Court’s opinion in Spokeo v. Robins indicated that courts should assess whether
the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts. . . . Spokeo does not require an exact
duplicate in American history and tradition. But Spokeo is not an open-ended invitation for
federal courts to loosen Article III based on contemporary, evolving beliefs about what kinds
of suits should be heard in federal courts.” (citation omitted)).
4 See Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2022) [hereinafter Privacy Harms].
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Court’s rejection of legislative recognition of harm in statutes is a profound
usurpation of legislative power.
TRANSUNION, FCRA, AND STANDING
In TransUnion, a class of 8,185 plaintiffs sued TransUnion for falsely labeling
them as potential terrorists in their credit reports.5 The plaintiffs initiated a class
action under the FCRA, which provides a private right of action for “[a]ny
person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this
subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer” for actual
damages or for statutory damages not less than $100 and not more than $1,000,
as well as for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.6 The plaintiffs alleged that
TransUnion violated the FCRA by failing to “follow reasonable procedures to
assure maximum possible accuracy” in consumer reports,7 and to “disclose to
the consumer ‘[a]ll information in the consumer’s file at the time of the
request.’”8 The plaintiffs also contended that TransUnion failed to follow the
FCRA’s requirement of providing a summary of their rights with each written
disclosure to them.9 Following a trial, the jury concluded that TransUnion had
engaged in these violations, providing each class member statutory damages of
$984.22 and punitive damages of $6,353.08.10 The total class damage award was
in excess of $60 million.11
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Kavanaugh concluded that the only
plaintiffs (1,853 individuals of the original 8,185) who had standing to sue in
federal court for lack of reasonable procedures were those whose credit reports
had been disseminated to third-party businesses.12 The 6,332 plaintiffs whose
credit reports labeled them as suspected national security threats but were not
shared with businesses lacked a “concrete” injury necessary for standing.13 For
the claims related to apprising plaintiffs of their rights, the majority found that
the plaintiffs (except for class representative Sergio Ramirez) lacked standing to
bring them because they had not shown that the errors caused concrete harm.14
The majority took this view even though Congress had explicitly granted
plaintiffs a private right of action to sue for such violations (without a showing
of additional injuries beyond the violations) and even though a jury found
TransUnion at fault.

5

See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
7 See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)).
8
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)).
9 Id. at 2200-01 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)).
10 Id. at 2202.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2200.
13 Id.
14 Id.
6
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STANDING DOCTRINE HAS NO STANDING
To have standing in federal court, there must be an “injury in fact,” which is
“an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized”
and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”15 In Spokeo, the Court
held, in a vague, confusing jumble of an opinion by Justice Alito, that courts
could reject standing even in cases where Congress granted plaintiffs a private
right of action to sue for violations of a statute.16 Spokeo similarly involved the
FCRA, and the Court remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to determine
whether the plaintiffs had suffered a concrete injury that the common law had
traditionally recognized as a sufficient basis for a lawsuit in American courts.17
The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue
because they were harmed due to inaccurate information in credit reports that
were available on Spokeo’s website.18 As the Ninth Circuit concluded, the
“dissemination of false information in consumer reports can itself constitute a
concrete harm.”19
The TransUnion Court justifies standing doctrine as essential to separation of
powers, as something hearkening back to the Framers of the Constitution and
woven into the U.S. Constitution. The Court sums up current standing doctrine
with a slogan: “No concrete harm, no standing.”20
But current standing doctrine—specifically the injury in fact requirement—is
actually a concoction of the Court from the 1970s, with Cass Sunstein calling
the requirement a “conceptual mistake.”21
As several scholars have argued, before the 1970s, the Court generally looked
to whether there was a “legal right” to determine standing.22 In 1970, the Court

15

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Congress’ role in identifying
and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injuryin-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”).
17 Id. at 1550.
18 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115-17 (9th Cir. 2017).
19 Id. at 1114.
20 See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
21 Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) (arguing that the requirement uses “highly contestable
ideas about political theory to invalidate congressional enactments” despite constitutional text
and history not calling for such invalidation).
22 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,
1065-66 (2015) (elaborating on the court’s position that standing, prior to the 1970s, depended
on whether the plaintiff had suffered an injury to an interest “within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question” (quoting Ass’n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970))); F. Andrew Hessick,
Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 290-99 (2008)
(discussing the development of the modern standing doctrine).
16
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appeared to add another basis for standing—injury in fact—not as a replacement
for the legal right test, but as an addition to it. Rachel Bayefsky writes:
The injury-in-fact requirement may have initially served to liberalize the
law of standing by permitting plaintiffs to allege that a particular course of
conduct had injured them “in fact” even if they could not show that they
possessed an individual legal right infringed by the challenged conduct.
But the injury-in-fact requirement began, in the 1970s, to be interpreted
more restrictively.23
According to Justice Thomas’s dissent:
Key to the scope of the judicial power, then, is whether an individual asserts
his or her own rights. At the time of the founding, whether a court
possessed judicial power over an action with no showing of actual damages
depended on whether the plaintiff sought to enforce a right held privately
by an individual or a duty owed broadly to the community. Where an
individual sought to sue someone for a violation of his private rights, such
as trespass on his land, the plaintiff needed only to allege the violation.24
Justice Thomas further notes:
This distinction mattered not only for traditional common-law rights, but
also for newly created statutory ones. The First Congress enacted a law
defining copyrights and gave copyright holders the right to sue infringing
persons in order to recover statutory damages, even if the holder “could not
show monetary loss.”25
We doubt that the Court will curtail lawsuits under copyright law for lack of
harm, as this would send shockwaves across the media industry. The Court has
typically used standing as a tool to help corporations elude lawsuits by
individuals. But Justice Thomas’s mention of copyright law demonstrates how
the shift in TransUnion could have dramatic implications. As is increasingly
common with Supreme Court cases lately, TransUnion purports to be a mere
application of current law when, in fact, it works a significant change in the law.
Supreme Court opinions often wear this mask, pretending to be routine and
concealing their radical departure from precedent. Spokeo made a significant
turn, and TransUnion pushes even further into this new territory. If Spokeo and
TransUnion are carried to their logical conclusion, common and longstanding
private rights of action for countless laws, including copyright law, might no
longer be viable in federal court. Of course, the Court could curtail such a result
through the selective application of the logic in these cases or by making
questionable distinctions so that only laws the justices dislike are affected.

23 Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2285,
2296 (2018).
24 See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2217 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas notes that plaintiffs long “could sue in federal court merely
by alleging a violation of a private right.”26 Justice Thomas then contends that
the majority rejects history by holding “that the mere violation of a personal
legal right is not—and never can be—an injury sufficient to establish
standing.”27 He further notes that it was not until 1970, nearly two centuries after
the drafting of the Constitution, that “this Court even introduced the ‘injury in
fact’ (as opposed to injury in law) concept of standing.”28
Current standing doctrine appears akin to the classic game of telephone,
where a person whispers a sentence to another person who then whispers it to
another person and so on down the line. When the game ends, the last person is
asked to repeat the sentence, which has inevitably morphed into something
entirely different from what was first said. That is what we have here—with
stakes for appropriate deference to legislative choices and consumer privacy that
could not be higher.
A NON-CONCRETE TEST FOR RECOGNIZING “INJURY IN FACT”
In TransUnion, a case with a different set of plaintiffs alleging claims under
the FCRA, the Court this time proceeded to make the standing determination
itself, purportedly under the Spokeo standard. The Court stated:
That inquiry asks whether plaintiffs have identified a close historical or
common-law analogue for their asserted injury. Spokeo does not require an
exact duplicate in American history and tradition. But Spokeo is not an
open-ended invitation for federal courts to loosen Article III based on
contemporary, evolving beliefs about what kinds of suits should be heard
in federal courts.29
In essence, for the majority in TransUnion, the test for whether an injury is
sufficiently “concrete” (and hence sufficient for standing) is how close it
approximates injury recognized by courts in the past. Where is the line to be
drawn? Instead of a clear test, we get a horseshoe test—close counts. But close
to what and how close is close enough? The test appears to be one that only
Justice Potter Stewart would love—the “I know it when I see it” test.30
Ironically, the Court in all its fuss about finding a “concrete” injury cannot even
come up with a concrete test.

26

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2219 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
29 See id. at 2204.
30 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [‘hard-core pornography’]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case
is not that.”).
27
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In addition to the vagueness of the test, another problem is the difficulty in
getting a clear read of the common law. The common law is evolving, not static,
so it is unclear what the majority means by “traditional.”31 On the one hand,
“traditional” injuries could mean injuries recognized at the time of the founding.
On the other hand, “traditional” injuries could mean injuries recognized over the
past century. The majority seems to be suggesting as much given its inclusion
of the torts of public disclosure of private facts and intrusion of seclusion as
illustrations of intangible harms “traditionally recognized as providing a basis
for lawsuits.”32 Both public disclosure of private facts and intrusion on seclusion
received recognition as privacy torts recently relative to other torts—only during
the mid-twentieth century.
Interestingly, the Court mentions the activities giving rise to privacy torts,
which were very heavily influenced by academic ideas. The privacy torts were
spawned from a law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in
1890.33 For more than a decade after the publication of the article, no court
recognized any privacy torts, and the first court to take up the issue rejected the
invitation to create a tort based on the Warren and Brandeis article.34 Slowly, in
the first half of the twentieth century, courts began to recognize the privacy torts.
In the middle of the century, William Prosser, a legal academic, wrote about the
torts and codified them in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Many courts were
then spurred to recognize the privacy torts.35
The common law is somewhat like a mutt—it is an amalgamation of ideas
from various sources, only some of which are judicial decisions. Courts
routinely recognize causes of action based even on non-legal sources. Thus, the
Court seems to have a view of “traditional” under the common law as involving
centuries-old precedents created by robed jurists in stuffy wood-paneled rooms.
But, in reality, the common law is cobbled together in a more eclectic and ad
hoc manner, almost bric-a-brac in nature.
Moreover, the Court misunderstands another aspect of the nature of the
common law—it is far from static. Although the privacy torts are wellrecognized today, it was a long process of fits and starts. Change in the common
law is messy and inconsistent. New situations are constantly thrown into the

31

See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2197 (“Central to assessing concreteness is whether the
asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis
for a lawsuit in American courts.”).
32 See id. at 2204.
33 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
34 Daniel J. Solove, Does Scholarship Really Have an Impact? The Article that
Revolutionized Privacy Law, TEACHPRIVACY (Mar. 30, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/doesscholarship-really-have-an-impact-the-article-that-revolutionized-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/3H3L-5P62].
35 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1891-95 (2010).
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cauldron, and it can take a while for the common law to recognize the analogies
between new situations and older ones.
The Court’s injury in fact approach looks for clarity in the common law, but
such clarity is quite elusive because the common law is far from consistent. In
our co-authored scholarship, we have shown that courts have recognized many
types of privacy harm and data breach harm, often inconsistently. With most
types of harm analyzed, courts have recognized similar types of harm in other
contexts but have struggled in the privacy and data breach context.36
As we have chronicled rather extensively, the courts are not speaking in a
clear “yes” or “no” answer when recognizing harm for privacy violations or data
breaches. Instead, the situation is akin to the Tower of Babel—everyone is
saying something different.
In short, courts should be reluctant to reify the common law for the purposes
of standing. The common law is constantly evolving, and it is doing so quite
rapidly in the privacy and data breach contexts.
Also, both the public disclosure and intrusion on seclusion torts involve
wrongful activities—the interference with rights—rather than setbacks to
interests or harms. Many scholars and Justice Thomas have noted that rights
were the original hook for standing, not harms.37 It is not by accident that Warren
and Brandeis’s article was called The Right to Privacy.38 Thus, ironically,
looking to history for a “common-law analogue” shows us that the common law
protected against violations to “rights,” the very thing the Court rejects as
sufficient for standing. Unfortunately, so much history and understanding of the
common law is lost to the majority of the Court.
A CRABBED UNDERSTANDING OF PRIVACY HARMS
In addition to erroneously looking to harm as a basis for standing, the Court
is also wrong in how it conceives of privacy harms. Interestingly, the majority
recognizes intrusion upon seclusion as a harm. For the privacy tort with that
name, no disclosure or dissemination of information is required at all. When
Prosser identified court decisions as comprising the tort of intrusion on seclusion
in his famous 1960 article, he explained that the harm being redressed was
primarily emotional distress.39 But no matter, the intrusion tort involves a wrong
that has nothing to do with dissemination of information. So why is the Court
requiring it for the FCRA?
36 See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of DataBreach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 751-54 (2018); Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra
note 4 (manuscript at 3) (on file with authors).
37 See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2219 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33.
39 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 392 (1960) (“It appears obvious
that the interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a mental one. It has been useful
chiefly to fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction of mental distress,
and whatever remedies there may be for the invasion of constitutional rights.”).
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In Privacy Harms, we contend that many types of privacy violations are
harmful in ways the courts sometimes fail to recognize.40 We demonstrate that
in many cases, there are other domains of the common law where courts
recognize harm that is conceptually similar.
The type of harm involved in TransUnion would be a “data quality harm”
under our typology. As we wrote:
Finding specific economic harms for incorrect information in records can
be challenging because errors or missions could lead to a variety of
consequences at some point in the future, long beyond the statute of
limitations for most causes of action. Suppose, for example, that a credit
report erroneously states that a person went bankrupt. Whether the error
causes any economic harm will depend upon how the report is used. A wise
person would likely refrain from seeking a loan while the error remains in
the report, as this could result in denial of the loan or a higher interest rate.41
With data quality harms, people will lose out on loans or jobs that they might
have obtained if their data were accurate. People often need to obtain a loan
quickly, so it does not make sense to try to obtain the loan before fixing the
errors in their credit reports. Likewise, if a person is going to be listed as a
potential terrorist, why bother even applying to a job? By the time the error is
fixed, the position will likely be filled. Thus, data quality harms involve the
chilling of behavior. People will not bother to apply for loans or jobs until the
error is cleaned up.
Further, we wrote: “It can be hard for individuals to find out about errors, and
when they do, third parties will ignore requests to correct them without the real
risk of litigation costs.”42 In TransUnion, the plaintiffs were also suing over
TransUnion’s failure to notify them of the problem with their records and their
failure to inform them about their rights to have the issue redressed.
Additionally, the TransUnion harm could also be an “emotional distress
harm,” as a reasonable person would certainly be justified in feeling emotional
distress at being labeled a potential terrorist.
As Justice Thomas notes in dissent, “one need only tap into common sense to
know that receiving a letter identifying you as a potential drug trafficker or
terrorist is harmful. All the more so when the information comes in the context
of a credit report, the entire purpose of which is to demonstrate that a person can
be trusted.”43
A USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
TransUnion is a usurpation of legislative power. Spokeo danced around the
issue, noting that Congress can play a role in defining harm and noting that in
40
41
42
43

Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note 4 (manuscript at 18) (on file with authors).
Id. (manuscript at 36) (on file with authors).
Id. (manuscript at 37) (on file with authors).
See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2223 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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certain cases, courts could override Congress’s determination.44 TransUnion
further encroaches on Congress’s power. Normally, it has been the conservatives
who have urged judicial restraint and deference to Congress. According to the
traditional conservative critique, so-called “activist” judges are purportedly
quick to override Congress’s judgment and make law themselves. But that’s just
what this conservative majority of the Supreme Court does: It essentially
rewrites the FCRA to be more to the Court’s liking.
When the FCRA was enacted by Congress, it had a private right of action for
violations of its rights and obligations. That private right of action was included
as a trade in exchange for severely limiting state privacy and defamation
claims.45 Congress decided upon the best mechanisms for enforcing the law.
President Nixon—a conservative in this bygone era—seemingly accepted the
private right of action because he signed the FCRA into law.
Using a private right of action is an important enforcement mechanism for
laws. Nearly all regulatory agencies are significantly understaffed and underresourced, and they cannot enforce in every case. They must be highly selective
in enforcement. A private right of action works to deputize “private attorneys
general” to help enforce the law. The monetary award works as a kind of bounty,
encouraging the private enforcement of the law and easing the burden on
regulators.46 For example, as one article aptly observes, “Private parties have
largely been responsible for enforcement of the [Telephone Consumer
Protection Act].”47
Now, fifty years later, the Supreme Court waltzed in to disapprove of the
FCRA’s enforcement mechanisms and allow courts to nullify them. This is akin
to rewriting the law.
Ironically, the Court aggrandizes the power of the Judiciary in the name of
“separation of powers” and the standing doctrine, which is designed to limit the
power of the courts.48 Standing is a “passive virtue,” a way for courts to sidestep
from entering into the political fray.49 But in TransUnion, standing is not a shield
that deflects but a sword that slices away parts of laws the judiciary dislikes. Far
from passive, standing now is weaponized, a tool to achieve political ends.

44

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
The FCRA provides partial immunity from lawsuits in state court based on defamation
and invasion of privacy. Plaintiffs can only sue when defendants acted “with malice or willful
intent to injure” plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
46 See Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4) (on file with
authors).
47 Spencer Weber Waller, Daniel B. Heidtke & Jessica Stewart, The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991: Adapting Consumer Protection to Changing Technology, 26 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 343, 375 (2014).
48 See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203.
49 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962).
45
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Normally, the role of the courts, especially for conservatives, is to defer to
Congress.
Let’s call TransUnion for what it is: an activist decision that nullifies
Congress’s power to protect consumers and that enables courts to rewrite
privacy laws to alter how they are enforced.

